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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
but what in equity and conscience he ought, he cannot recover it back in an
action for money had and received. But where money is paid under a mis-
take of fact which there is no ground to claim in conscience, the party may
recover it back again by this kind of action." Bize v. Dickason (1786) 1
T. R. 285, 99 Eng. Repr. 1097. Thus it would seem to be inequitable to al-
low the defendant (the cashing bank in the principal case) to retain the
money that it had received by virtue of the confidence that one bank places
in another, and to permit the defendant to take undue advantage of a situa-
tion brought about by this confidence. "It is a matter of general informa-
tion that in dealings between banks and especially with reference to clear-
ings, banks will adjust and pay differences between each other or between
themselves and the clearing house upon the faith of the indorsements by the
other banks of checks involved in such settlement, relying on such indorse-
ments as protecting them in such payment should the subsequent and more
careful scrutiny of the signatures disclose forgeries in the making and in-
dorsing of the checks so paid." (Writer's italics) 3 R. C. L. 527.
To allow the doctrine of Price v. Neal to be brought in for the purpose
of barring a recovery in a case of this kind, would upset this established
banking practice and thus tend to destroy the celerity and facility with
which checks are cleared. The doctrine as laid down by Lord Mansfield
could hardly be applied here where the intervening considerations of pres-
ent day banking practice figure so largely in the case. For cases in accord
with the instant decision see, Farmers' Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Farmers'
and Traders' Bank of Maysville (1914) 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986, L. R. A.
1915 A. 77; Ellis and Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. (1855) 4 Ohio
St. 628; cases contra: Commercial and Farmers' Nat. Bank v. First Nat.
Bank (1868) 30 Md. 11; Howard and Preston v. Miss. Valley Bank of
Vicksburg (1876) 28 La. Ann. 727, 26 Am. Rep. 105.
D. P., '33.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WTNESSES-CMPULSION OvER ABSENT NA-
TIONALS.-In Blackmer v. United States (1932) 52 Sup. Ct. 252, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia holding constitutional the Walsh Act which provides
for a method of compelling attendance in Federal Courts of witnesses ab-
sent in foreign countries. Blackmer v. United States (1931) 49 F. (2d)
523. For a comment on the decision of the Appeals Court see (1931) 17
ST. LoUIs L. REv. 85.
As did the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of the
obligations of citizenship, the citizen is bound by laws made applicable to
him in a foreign country. Cook v. Tail (1924) 265 U. S. 47; United States
v. Bowman (1922) 260 U. S. 94. Legislation of Congress is usually con-
strued to apply only within the territorial limits of the United States, but
the question of its application so far as citizens are concerned is one of con-
struction and not of legislative power. American Banana Co. v. United
States (1909) 213 U. S. 347; Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board (1925)
268 U. S. 619. The Court entertained no doubt as to the sovereign power of
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the United States to compel a citizen, absent abroad, to return to this coun-
try. Compare Bartue and Duchess of Suffolk's Case (1559) 72 Eng. Repr.
388; Knowles v. Luce (1579) 72 Eng. Repr, 473. Rather in contrast to the
Appeals Court, the Supreme Court regarded as the important question the
method of enforcing the obligation. It held that since Congress can define
the obligation, it can prescribe the penalty and method of enforcing it. The
proceeding of a seizure of property to secure payment of a penalty is a
familiar practice where absence of the recalcitrant or other circumstances
make it necessary. Cooper v. Reynolds (1870) 77 U. S. 308.
A contention that the offence was criminal in its nature and that it was
unconstitutional to proceed to judgment in the absence of the defendant was
held untenable in nature. Contempt proceedings are said to be sui generis
and not criminal by nature. Myers v. United States (1923) 264 U. S. 95.
The novel defense that the act was discriminatory since it would be ineffec-
tive against contumacious witnesses who owned no property to seize was al-
so overriden. Liability under the act is placed on the disobedience of the
witness and not ownership of property.
The decisions of the two courts emphasize the paramount duty of every
citizen to aid in the administration of justice by appearing and testifying
in court when wanted. Blair v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 273. If a
like conception were entertained by citizens greater efficacy would be given
to our criminal administration. The Walsh Act should prove an invaluable
aid to enforcement of Federal laws.
Similar state statutes have not as yet been tested.
V. P. K., '33.
INTERSTATE COMMERcE-LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
TO SUE-CONTRACTS CONTEMPLATING IMPORTATION.-Plaintiffs, doing busi-
ness as partners in Illinois, contracted with a citizen of Arkansas to sell
goods as ordered by him, to be delivered on board cars at Freeport, Illinois,
or at their nearest branch warehouse. The contract referred to defendant
as "the salesman" and specified that payment was to be made according to
defendant's sales and collections, defendant having the right to return goods
unsold upon the termination of the contract. Defendant placed an order,
which was received by plaintiffs in Illinois, shipment being made from the
Memphis, Tennessee, warehouse. The goods in question were manufactured
and owned by an Illinois corporation for which plaintiffs were not only
selling agents, but also in which they were officers and principal stock-
holders. The corporation was rot qualified in Arkansas as required by
statutes of that state providing that foreign corporations, as a prerequisite
to doing business in the state, comply with certain conditions, failure to do
so resulting in an incapacity to sue. Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford and Moses,
1921) secs. 1829, 1832. In an action on the contract in the Arkansas courts
recovery was denied the plaintiffs on the ground that they were acting as
agents of the corporation, and that the defendant was in turn acting as
their agent, and hence the corporation through its agents, was doing busi-
ness in Arkansas. But the Supreme Court of the United States held, that
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